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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The only issues before the Court are whether the lower Court
properly interpreted the phrasef "material contributing cause," and
whether that interpretation was correctly applied to the uncontroverted facts established by the parties,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Plaintiff Ronald Draughon brought an action for a declaration
of coverage under a credit life insurance policy issued by CUNA
Mutual Insurance Company ("CUNA") for the death of his wife. CUNA
has denied coverage on the basis of an exclusionary provision concerning injuries or death resulting from conditions which existed prior
to the issuance of the policy.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition
The Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment.
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

Defendant

On April 9, 1987, the

District Court issued its Ruling granting Defendant's motion for
summary judgment and denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The Judgment was signed on May 5, 19 87.

Statement of the Facts
Plaintiff Ronald Draughon brought this action seeking a declaration of coverage under a credit life insurance policy issued by CUNA
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Mutual Insurance Company ("CUNA").

(R. 1-3)

The policy was issued

in connection with an automobile loan made in October, 1985, to
Ronald and Sandra Draughon.

Subject to certain conditions and

exceptions, the insurance contract obligated CUNA to pay the balance
due on the automobile loan in the event of the death of Sandra
Draughon.

(R. 51)

Prior to issuance of the policy in 1982, Sandra Draughon was
diagnosed as having reflux nephropathy (kidney disease).

(R. 27-

28) Her disease was initially treated with hemodialysis three times
per week, for three to four hours per session.
Border, M.D., p. 14)

(Deposition of W.A.

Her treating physician, Dr. Border, reported

numerous side effects of renal failure from which Mrs. Draughon
suffered, including anemia, insomnia and restlessness.

(Deposition

of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 14) The dialysis treatment also created a
range of side effects to which Mrs. Draughon was subject, such as
vomiting, muscle cramps and hypotension. (Deposition of W.A. Border,
M.D., p. 17) A kidney transplant, if successful, would have alleviated those side effects.

(Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 15)

The decision to undergo a kidney transplant is made after
extensive counseling with the patient.

Once the decision is made

to proceed, there is a delay of four to six months while the patient
awaits a donor. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., pp. 5-7) Following
issuance of the insurance policy in October, 1985, Sandra Draughon
underwent a kidney transplant in November, 1985. (R. 1, 7, 28) Following post-surgical treatment, Sandra Draughon developed pancreatitis from which she eventually died on February 7, 1986.
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(R. 28)

CUNA denied Mr. Draughon's claim on the basis of the "risks not
assumed" clause which states, in pertinent part:
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and no
benefit is provided for any loss if any material
contributing cause of loss was from sickness or
injury which first became manifest prior to the
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective
under the Contract. (R. 7-8)
Summary of Arguments
The disposition of this case depends upon only one issue: was
Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease a material contributing cause of her
death.

The phrase, material contributing cause, as used in the

policy is not ambiguous. It has a meaning which is easily understood
by a person of ordinary intelligence.
A material contributing cause is not necessarily a proximate
cause of injury.

It may be merely an important cause.

Her kidney

disease was clearly the cause of Mrs. Draughon's decision to undergo
a kidney transplant. As a result of complications from the transplant
surgery, Mrs. Draughon contracted the disease which caused her death.
Even if the Court applies a proximate cause analysis to the
phrase, it is evident that Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease was a
proximate cause of her death. It was the efficient cause, the cause
which set in motion all the other factors which eventually ended in
her death.
Because Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease, the onset of which
predated the issuance of the CUNA policy, was a material contributing
cause of her death, coverage under the credit life policy is excluded.
Thus, the Court's judgment in favor of Defendant CUNA was proper and
should be sustained by this Court.
-3-

ARGUMENT
MRS. DRAOGHOJPS KIDNEY DISEASEf WHICH EXISTED
PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF DEFENDANT'S INSURANCE
POLICY, WAS A MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE OF HER
DEATH ANDf THEREFORE, NO COVERAGE IS PROVIDED.
The CUNA policy at issue in this case states in pertinent part:
CUNA Mutual does not assume the risk and no
benefit is provided for any loss if any material
contributing cause of loss was from sickness or
injury which first became manifest prior to the
time insurance coverage was otherwise effective
under the Contract.
The Court on appeal is asked to interpret the phrase, "material
contributing cause," in light of the facts presented to the Court
concerning Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease and eventual death as a
result of the complications from a kidney transplant operation.

A. THE PHRASE, "MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE"
MUST BE INTERPRETED MORE BROADLY THAN THE LEGAL
TERM, "PROXIMATE CAUSE"
The Plaintiff has sought to characterize the phrase, "material
contributing cause," as a synonym for the legal term, "proximate
cause."

There is no authority for such a definition.

Indeed, the

authority which has interpreted the phrase has established much
broader parameters than those established for proximate cause.
Couch on Insurance, Section 41:408, discusses the phrase, "contributing cause of death," and states:
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A provision excluding liability when a disease,
defect or bodily infirmity is a contributing
cause of death, in addition to excluding liability in cases where disease, defect or bodily
infirmity is a proximate cause of the insured's
death, excludes causes where the disease, defect
or bodily infirmity is a contributing cause of
the insured's death regardless of whether the
disease, defect or bodily infirmity is the proximate cause thereof.
Thus, although the proximate cause of death may be a contributing
cause of the death, the reverse does not necessarily hold.
The parameters in which the phrase, "material contributing
cause" may be applied have been set by the Oregon Supreme Court in
numerous cases decided in the context of Oregon's workmen's compensation law. Contrary to Plaintiff's contention, the Oregon Court's
interpretation of the phrase is relevant to the present case.
Under Oregon's law, a workmen's compensation claimant is entitled to compensation for aggravation of an earlier compensable
injury if the earlier injury is a material contributing cause of the
present condition and not solely the result of a non-industrial
cause. Grable v. Weyerhauser Co., 291 Or 387, 631 P.2d 768 (1981).
The earlier compensable injury need not be the sole or even
principal cause of the claimant's worsened condition.

Manous v.

Argonaut Inc., 79 Or App 645, 719 P.2d 1318 (1986); Coddington v.
SAIF, 68 Or App 439, 681 P.2d 799 (1984); Peterson v. Eugene F.
Burrill Lumber, 294 Or 537, 660 P.2d 1058 (1983).

For instance, in

Coddington, supra, the claimant had a history of degenerative disc
disease and back problems, both prior and subsequent to her first
industrial injury.

She sustained a non-industrial injury to her

back after the first industrial injury and subsequently suffered a
-5-

herniated disc.

Even though the off-the-job injury contributed to

the herniation, so did the first industrial accident.

The first

industrial accident was, therefore, a material contributing cause
of the disc herniation.
Similarly, Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease created the condition
which required the transplantation operation and immunosuppressive
treatment with Prednisone.

The fatal pancreatitis which resulted

from that treatment was linked inextricably to her original condition.
Although the district court's decision is not binding on this
Court, it is certainly entitled to consideration.

The examples

offered by the Court as the basis for its decision are cogent. The
Court stated:
As a practical matter, patients often do not die
from their underlying illness; arteriosclerosis
victims die of cardiac arrest and AIDS victims
die of pneumonia, yet in those cases, the common
perception of the resulting death is the underlying disease.
If the Plaintiff's argument that because the transplant surgery
was "elective" there was no relation between the kidney disease and
the complications associated with that surgery is accepted, then
most pre-existing disease exceptions in life insurance policies would
be avoided.

Clearly, if Plaintiff's argument is accepted, any

complication of treatment for a disease would not be considered as
caused by the disease.
For example, a cancer patient may be given several years to
live, but expected to have a less than normal life expectancy and
to live with increasing pain.

Radiation therapy could be expected

to reduce the cancer's growth and thereby expand the life expectancy
-6-

and retard the pain. If that patient elects to undergo the radiation
therapy and dies as a result of a complication therefrom, the cancer
is certainly a contributing cause of the death. On the other 1 land,
if the patient is killed in an automobile accident while driving to
the hospital, to receive the radiation therapy, the automobile accident
would be an intervening cause of the death.
Fundamental fairness and logic require that the Court interpret
the CUNA policy excl usi on to fii id that where the condition, kidney
failure, was acted upon by other factors in an uninterrupted chain
of causation, resulting from the good faith attempt to treat the
disease, the disease is a material contribut I ng cause of the ultimate
death. Any other interpretation would simply void the policy exclusion, which the parties obviously intended to have some meaning.
Even if the Court equates "material contributing cause" with
"proximate cause," Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease must be considered
a proximate cause of her death.

Proximate cause is the cause,

which in the natural and continual sequence,
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause),
produces the injury without which the result
would not have occurred. It is the efficient
cause - the one that necessarily sets in operation
the factors that accomplish the injury. Mitchell
v. Pearson Ent., 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), at
245-246.
It is Plaintiff's contention that the transplantation operation broke
the chain of causation because the surgery was "elective." It cannot
be reasonably contended that the transplant would have been proposed
in the absence of serious renal disease.

The treatment following

the transp1ant opera11on apparen11 y foilowed the norma1 course for
such

operations,

including

administration
-7-

of

Prednisone,

an

immunosuppresant drug.

The adverse reaction to Prednisone in the

form of pancreatitis is "an uncommon, but not unknown complication
associated with kidney transplantation."

(R. 49)

Without kidney

disease, a transplant operation would not have been performed and
the resulting complications would not have occurred.

B.
"MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE" IS NOT AN
AMBIGUOUS PHRASE
As stated in Couch on Insurance, Section 41:408, the phrase
"contributing cause of death" connotes more than "proximate cause."
It is merely a cause which contributes to the injury or death. The
addition to the phrase in this policy of the word, "material," does
not render the phrase ambiguous. It merely requires that the condition
which contributes to the insured1s injury or death be important and
not merely incidental.
Insurance policies are merely contracts which are interpreted
by usual rules of contract interpretation.

The words contained in

the insurance contract are to be given their "usual and ordinarily
accepted meaning."

Bergera v. Ideal National Life Ins. Co., 524

P.2d 599 (Utah 1974).

The phrase, "material contributing cause,"

has an ordinary meaning, easily understandable to a person of ordinary
intelligence.
In the present case, the kidney disease was an important contributing cause of Mrs. Draughon's death. Her kidney disease required
that she undergo dialysis treatment three times per week for three
to four hours per session.

(Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 14)
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As a result of dialysis, Mrs. Draughon suffered vomiting, muscle
cramps, and hypotension. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D.r p. 14)
Dialysis also resulted in psychological dependence on dialysis.
(Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 17)

Kidney failure caused

anemia, insomnia and restlessness. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D. ,
p. I 4 ) A kidney transplant would alleviate those reactions. (Deposition of W.A. Border, M.D., p. 15)

Mrs. Draughon's decision to

undergo the transplant operation resulted from the ill effects of
her diseased kidney.

Certainly no such operation would be under-

taken on a person with a healthy kidney as Plaintiff seems to suggest
^n

h£s

krief

at

page 26. Although Mrs. Draughon was extraordinary

in her ability to participate in the usual activities of life while
undergoing dialysis treatment, it is ridiculous to suggest, as the
Plaintiff does, that she lived a normal life.

The horrific side

effects of the dialysis, as well as the time-consuming nature of the
treatment, required a supreme effort from Mrs. Draughon to accomplish
all that she did. Certain!y, the choice she made to have a kidney
transplant was influenced by the possibility that she could thereafter
forego dialysis.
The treatment following transplantation included administration
of the immunosuppressive drug, Prednisone, which her physicians have
determined most likely caused the acute pancreati tis whi ch i iltimately
resulted in her death.

(R. 49)

This chain of events establishes

an unbroken sequence which starts with Mrs. Draughon's kidney disease
and e-".-r *

-

leath.

There cai i be i :io question that t rer kidney
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disease was a material contributing cause of the complication which
resulted in her death.

CONCLUSION
Mrs. Draughon's death as a result of pancreatitis was the end of
a chain of causation which began with her renal disease. The renal
disease was a condition which existed prior to the issuance of CUNA's
insurance policy.

The renal disease was a material contributing

cause of Mrs. Draughon's death and her death is, therefore, excluded
from coverage under the policy.

The Court should sustain the lower

court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

6

day of October, 1987.

BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
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